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ABSTRACT. In his criticism of Armstrong’s argument against nominalism, Parsons (1999) makes a crucial use of a 
notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: (i) does not entail truthmaker es-
sentialism, (ii) is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and (iii) is useful in Armstrong’s argument against 
Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons’ notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory char-
acter of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong super-
venience fails in two respects: (i) it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and (ii) it does not preserve 
the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, 
Armstrong’s truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated. 
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1. Parsons on Armstrong’s argument against nominalism 
Parsons (1999) claims that Armstrong’s argument against nominalism is not a truth-
maker argument. Parsons starts his criticism of Armstrong by contrasting Armstrong’s 
argument against Ryle (the AR-argument) and his argument against nominalism (the 
AN-argument). Armstrong contends that the two arguments are similar and calls them 
“truthmaker arguments”, since they depend on a crucial premise: the truthmaker prin-
ciple. Roughly, the truthmaker principle says that for any true sentence there is a 
truthmaker (i.e., something in the world that makes it true).1 According to Armstrong, 
the truthmaker principle entails truthmaker essentialism, namely, the thesis that the 
existence of a truthmaker entails the truth of the sentence it makes true. However, 
Parsons contends that the truthmaker principle is independent of truthmaker essentia-
lism, and he argues that the AN-argument and the AR-argument are not alike. The 
reason is as follows: the AR-argument makes use of the truthmaker principle, but not 
of truthmaker essentialism, whereas the AN-argument requires both premisses. 
 Parsons maintains that there are still more differences between the two arguments. 
On his view, the AN-argument is not a truthmaker argument, since it does not in fact 
require the truthmaker principle. According to Parsons, the AN-argument makes use 
of the truthmaker principle and truthmaker essentialism only to force the nominalist 
to embrace Leibnizian essentialism (the thesis that all intrinsic properties of a thing are 
essential to it). However, Leibnizian essentialism conflicts with the contingency intui-
tion: there are intrinsic properties which are not essential to the things that have them, 
                                                     
1 Assumedly, the principle will not hold for every type of sentence. Perhaps only simple, contingent, af-
firmative and predicative sentences fall under its domain. 
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and there seems to be no way for the nominalist to solve the antinomy. Although 
Armstrong is also embracing a form of Leibnizian essentialism, his ontological resour-
ces (universals, thin particulars and states of affairs) suffice to resolve the antinomy. 
At this stage, the AN-argument can be summarized as follows: the realist is in a better 
position than the nominalist to coherently hold both the contingency intuition and the 
conjunction of the truthmaker principle and truthmaker essentialism. However, Par-
sons concludes that given that (i) the truthmaker principle is too weak to obtain Leib-
nizian essentialism, and (ii) Leibnizian essentialism on its own refutes nominalism in 
the AN-argument, the truthmaker principle (and truthmaker essentialism as well) 
should be dropped as a premise in the AN-argument. The proper way to understand 
the AN-argument, according to Parsons, is to take the contingency intuition and Lei-
binizian essentialism as its premisses and the negation of nominalism (there are only 
concrete things) as a conclusion. Thus, the AN-argument is not a truthmaker argu-
ment at all, for it does not make essential use of the truthmaker principle. 
 I disagree with Parsons on a main point. Parsons’ attempt to characterize a notion 
of truthmaker which must be neutral on the issue of nominalism but suitable to the 
AR-argument fails because it makes use of a notion of weak supervenience. In addi-
tion, the natural reformulation of his proposal in terms of strong supervenience fails 
by not being neutral on the issue of nominalism and also by not preserving the notion, 
essential to the concept of truthmaker, that truthmakers explain the truth of their 
truthbearers. It follows from these two main objections that Parsons’ interpretation of 
the AN-argument is not correct and also that the AN-argument should be considered 
a truthmaker argument with the truthmaker principle as its main premise, rather than 
an argument that stems from Leibnizian essentialism (which would no doubt be an in-
teresting argument by itself). Hence, the AN-argument and the AR-argument are, as 
Armstrong holds, the same style of argument. 
2. Parsons’ notion of truthmaking 
First of all, let us state truthmaker essentialism: 
(TE) If A makes S true then necessarily: if A exists, then S is true. 
It is no accident that most versions of the notion of truthmaker include truthmaker 
essentialism as a constitutive ingredient of truthmaking. Truthmakers are theoretical 
entities posited to give a metaphysical explanation of the truth of true sentences. The 
modal connection holding between truthmaker and truthbearer stated by truthmaker 
essentialism is intended to satisfy this purpose. Parsons, however, intends to give a 
formulation of the truthmaker principle that does not assume truthmaker essentialism 
(Parsons 1999, pp. 328-329). In this section I will argue that Parsons’s definition, 
which avoids (TE), does not satisfy the explanatory purpose. 
 According to Parsons, the general form of the truthmaker principle is as follows: 
[T]o say that a certain class of sentences (in our case, sentences asserting dispositions) are made 
true is to say that those sentences supervene for their truth on the qualitative properties of some-
 
Truthmaking and Supervenience 
 
 
193 
thing in the world. ‘Qualitative’ is here used by contrast with ‘dispositional’, but is equally in-
tended to cover something of what is meant by ‘intrinsic’. (Parsons 1999, p. 326). 
 Since the principle is also proposed in a context in which nominalism is at stake, 
Parsons favours a more neutral version that avoids explicit talk of properties: 
(P) For every true sentence, there is something on whose nature that sentence’s 
truth supervenes, and that thing is the sentence’s truthmaker (Parsons 1999, p. 
326), where by ‘nature’ of a thing is meant “a grand conjunctive property, con-
joining all of the thing’s intrinsic properties” (Parsons 1999, p. 326, italics 
mine). 
 This peculiar characterization of the truthmaker principle has three main motiva-
tions: it attempts not to beg the question against nominalism, nor to entail Leibnizian 
essentialism, nor to entail truthmaker essentialism. I think that Parsons’ characteriza-
tion of the truthmaker principle only succeeds in avoiding the three commitments be-
cause it is defective. 
 Let us focus our attention on the notion of supervenience that Parsons uses in this 
characterization. What kind of supervenience relation does he invoke? Although he is 
not very explicit on this matter, the following passage seems to point to what is com-
monly labelled as “weak supervenience”: 
To put this another way, for every true sentence, there is some thing such that sentence cannot 
become false without a qualitative change, a non-Cambridge change, in that thing. That thing, 
whatever it is, is the sentence’s truthmaker. (Parsons 1999, p. 327.) 
 If we make explicit this appeal to a weak notion of supervenience, Parsons’ truth-
maker principle should be understood as follows: 
  (WP) For any true sentence, there is something on whose nature the truth of 
the sentence weakly supervenes, and this something is the sentence’s truth-
maker.2
 It should be noted that the use of weak supervenience avoids committing the 
truthmaker principle to truthmaker essentialism: it does not follow from the fact that 
the actual truth of ‘Jim is scared’ weakly supervenes on Jim’s nature that ‘Jim is scared’ 
must be true in any possible world in which Jim has that nature.  
 However (WP) cannot be a good general characterization of the notion of truth-
maker, since it does not guarantee the explanatory character that the truthmaker is as-
sumed to have. In order to explain the actual truth of a sentence, any truthmaker T 
should at least be modally tied to the truth of S in the following way: if T (which has 
actually nature N) makes true S in the actual world, then in any possible world where 
nature N exists, S is true. If Jim, given his scaredness, is what explains the truth of ‘Jim 
is scared’, then it should be the case that in any possible world where his scaredness 
exists the sentence ‘Jim is scared’ must be true in that world. 
                                                     
2 The truth of S weakly supervenes on x’s nature, N, if and only if necessarily (if S is true then N exists 
and if N exists S is true). 
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 This drawback becomes even more apparent when we consider Parsons’ central 
contention that (WP) can be also employed in Armstrong’s AR-argument and it con-
demns Parsons’ general strategy to failure. Truthmakers as defined by (WP) cannot be 
used in Armstrong’s AR-argument because they lack explanatory force, since they 
don’t allow the kind of transworld inferences that are required for the explanation to 
be successful. According to AR-argument, saying that a certain object has some dispo-
sitional property entails that the object has some (non-dispositional) property that ex-
plains the fact that the object displays a certain behaviour. But it follows from this that 
in any possible world with the same laws as the actual world in which the object has 
that non-dispositional property, the object displays the same behaviour. Parsons 
seems to interpret Armstrong in the same way: 
It may be true that someone has a belief which is never manifested in their behavioral disposi-
tions: the belief that worms are not typically bearded, for example. Armstrong agreed with Ryle’s 
dispositional view about belief, though; it’s just that he insisted that there must be some differ-
ence in the world, some difference that the disposition makes, which makes it true that, at times 
when the disposition is not being manifested, it would be manifested, were we to ask, say ‘Do 
worms have beards?’ (Parsons 1999, p. 326). 
 On my view, this entails that the non-dispositional property which is responsible 
for x’s belief that worms are not typically bearded is such that in any possible world 
with the same laws as the actual world in which x has that non-dispositional property 
and is asked whether worms are typically bearded, x answers negatively. The truth-
maker principle should at least be formulated in a way that it allows these transworld 
inferences if truthmakers have to explain their related truths. 
 A way to grant these transworld inferences may be to interpret (P) in terms of 
strong supervenience: 
(SP) For any true sentence, there is something on whose nature the truth of the 
sentence strongly supervenes, and this something is the sentence’s truthmaker.3
 I will attempt now to justify that (SP): 
(i) is not neutral as to the nominalism issue, because it is committed to (ia) non-
interchangeable tropes and (ib) propertyless abstracta4 (if it is to avoid truth-
maker essentialism),  
(ii) it cannot preserve the thesis that the truthmaking relation is an explanatory 
relation. 
(ia) According to (SP), as the truth of a sentence strongly supervenes on the nature of 
something in the world, then the existence of the nature of this something entails the 
truth of the sentence. But this seems to work only if the nature of something is taken 
in a particular(ized) way and essentially tied to that something. The truth of the sen-
                                                     
3 The truth of S strongly supervenes on x’s nature, N, if and only if necessarily ((if S is true then N exists) 
and necessarily if N exists then S is true). 
4 Also called “bare particulars”; namely, entities devoid of properties. 
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tence ‘Jim is scared’ supervenes on Jim’s scaredness, but only because is Jim’s scared-
ness. If Jim’s scaredness were part of the nature of a different individual, let us say 
Ross, then the truth of ‘Jim is scared’ could not supervene on Jim’s scaredness, since 
then this sentence should be true if Ross is scared.5 Parsons use of ‘nominalism’ is ex-
plicitly strong and excludes tropes, as any other property-like entity. My point here is 
just that there is no way to make sense of the application of (SP) other than taking na-
tures of things as non-interchangeable tropes essentially tied to these things. Hence, 
(SP) is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism. 
(ib) Besides, (SP) can avoid truthmaker essentialism only at the cost of positing prop-
ertyless abstracta. Can Jim, taken along with his nature, be the truthmaker for the true 
sentence ‘Jim is scared’ according to (SP)? Clearly not, if truthmaker essentialism is to 
be avoided. Assume that Jim, along with his scaredness, is the truthmaker for the true 
sentence ‘Jim is scared’. Then, as the truth of ‘Jim is scared’ strongly supervenes on 
Jim’s scaredness, Jim, taken along with his scaredness, cannot fail to make true the 
sentence ‘Jim is scared’. Hence, the truthmaker for ‘Jim is scared’ should be Jim de-
void of his nature.  
 Thus, this theory involves non-interchangeable tropes and propertyless abstracta. 
This is a high price to payto avoid truthmaker essentialism.6
(ii) (SP) denies that truths strongly supervene on their truthmakers, but it still allows 
that they strongly supervene on the nature of their truthmakers. It must say that even 
if a thing, which is a truthmaker for S, can exist while S be false, things such as truth-
makers can still (partially) explain the truth of the sentences they make true by contin-
gently having a nature on which the truth of the sentence strongly supervenes. It 
could be objected that if this is the case, then we can rid ourselves of such things as 
truthmakers since the explanatory role for their truths is played well enough by their 
natures alone. However, if my above argument is correct, these natures must be taken 
as particular(ized) natures that are essentially tied to the things that have them. Jim’s 
scaredness could not exist if Jim does not. Thus, natures are existentially dependent 
on things and we cannot get rid of things and just retain their natures. 
 Now, we should ask: what explains the truth of the true sentence ‘Jim is scared’, 
according to (SP)? There are two candidates: the sentence truthmaker, “Bare Jim” (Jim 
devoid of his nature) and the supervenience basis for the truth of the sentence, Jim’s 
scaredness (particularized and essentially tied to Jim). However, neither of these can-
                                                     
5 Notice that this still does not amount to Leibnizian essentialism, since for all that has been said Jim 
could still have had a different nature, although his nature could not have been the nature of another 
individual. 
6 In order to be fair to the nominalist, it seems that the truthmaker principle should be formulated as fol-
lows: 
(P*) For every true sentence, there is something on which the truth of this sentence strongly su-
pervenes, and this thing is the sentence’s truthmaker. 
Now, the problem for Parsons’ strategy would be that this characterization entails truthmaker essential-
ism. 
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didates explains by itself the truth of ‘Jim is scared’. Jim’s scaredness, being existen-
tially dependent on Jim, cannot, by itself (i.e., without Jim), explain that truth. Nor is 
Bare Jim by itself able to explain the truth of ‘Jim is scared’.7
 If you completely split up truthmaking and supervenience to avoid truthmaker es-
sentialism by having an independent entity as the supervenience base to play the ex-
planatory role, then the truthmaking entity is not explanatory at all, since it is the sub-
venient entity that accounts for the truth by itself. (SP)’s strategy is to state that the 
subvenient entity is a dependent entity whose existence is essentially tied to the exis-
tence of the truthmaker. As the subvenient entity does indeed have an explanatory 
role and its existence requires the existence of the truthmaker, it can be argued that 
the truthmaker also plays an explanatory role. But this only shows that the intended 
subvenient entity cannot play the explanatory role by itself. Only if we bring together 
the intended subvenient entity and the intended truthmaker will we have a complete 
account for the truth. There seems to be no way of avoiding truthmaker essentialism 
if truthmakers are to explain truths. But that is precisely their intended function. 
3. The AN-argument is a truthmaker argument 
I think that Parsons has failed to prove that the AN-argument is not a truthmaker ar-
gument. His argument is as follows:  
(i) You can have a truthmaker argument without assuming truthmaker essential-
ism (by stating the truthmaker principle (WP), which does not assume truth-
maker essentialism). 
(ii) Such an argument causes no trouble for the nominalist. 
(iii) Armstrong’s AN-argument causes trouble for the nominalist only by 
assuming truthmaking essentialism. 
(iv) Truthmaking essentialism is merely a way to drive the nominalist to em-
brace Leibnizian essentialism. 
Conclusion: 
(v) We have no truthmaker argument against nominalism. What we really have 
is an argument against nominalism which has Leibnizian essentialism as a prem-
ise. 
 We have seen thatParsons’ truthmaker principle (WP) should be rejected since it 
does not correctly characterize truthmaking. Hence, (i) is false. Besides, my critical 
                                                     
7 Notice that if (SP) were rephrased by placing Jim’s having his scaredness as the supervenience basis for 
the truth of ‘Jim is scared’ instead of merely Jim’s scaredness, then it would be Jim’s having his scar-
edness on its own that would do the whole job of account for the truth of the sentence ‘Jim is 
scared’. Hence, it would be absurd to insist on saying that Bare Jim is the truthmaker for ‘Jim is 
scared’. The truthmaker would be Jim’s having his scaredness and we would be committed to truth-
maker essentialism after all. 
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considerations on principle (SP) point to the fact that there are no non-essential 
truthmakers. Thus, (iv) is also false. I think that we should conclude that Parsons’ ar-
gument fails.  
 Why should we maintain that the proper way to understand the AN-argument is to 
have it involve the truthmaker principle (and truthmaker essentialism) rather than 
Leibnizian essentialism? I think that they are two different arguments that should be 
kept separate. But it is clear that the AN-argument was intended by Armstrong as a 
truthmaker argument and I have given reasons for interpreting it in this way. Which 
argument one prefers depends on the independent merits one thinks that the truth-
maker principle (committed to truthmaker essentialism) or Leibnizian essentialism 
may have.8
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